Yes, Eric, I think it's correct that there was zero direct evidence that GZ initiated the fight. Indeed, there was zero direct evidence that he even participated in it, other than passively. To Anne's question, since self-defense is a defense to all levels of homicide, I don't think that starting with manslaughter or felony child abuse murder (as the state tried to get in at the end) would, alone, have worked any better than starting with second degree (I acknowledge that the overcharge may have framed things for the jury in a way that hurt the prosecution; but I don't think that the evidence presented supports even manslaughter). The best chance at a manslaughter conviction might have been for the state to have succeeded in having the jury instructed on provocation. Alafair Burke has suggested as much in HuffPo (and see, too, Volokh's post on "provocation and self-defense," which links to Burke). Although I ultimately disagree that this is likely to have made a difference in the jury verdict, it's worth considering, because this portion of Florida self-defense law was clearly relevant, although the jury wasn't instructed on it. The Florida criminal code provides as follows: 776.041 Use of force by aggressor.—The justification described in the preceding sections of this chapter [e.g., both self-defense & SYG] is not available to a person who: (1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony; or (2) Initially provokes the use of force against himself or herself, unless: (a) Such force is so great that the person reasonably believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or she has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or (b) In good faith, the person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force. In this case, the relevant prong is (2), and Florida courts have interpreted "provokes" as limited to "force or threat of force." Since, as Eric notes, there is insufficient evidence that GZ first (or perhaps ever) used force against TM, we narrow still further to the issue of "threat of force." There WAS some evidence -- both direct and circumstantial -- that TM reasonably perceived GZ's behavior to constitute a threat of force. But is the standard requires merely that TM have reasonably believed GZ to have been threatening force, or must there be sufficient evidence that GZ in fact intended to threaten force (of which I think there was close to none)? More importantly, even if TM's reasonable belief that GZ was threatening force suffices, the analysis doesn't end there, and I don't see how we get BYR on (2)(a), which is not much different from the regular self-defense standard on which GZ prevailed, in that it justifies GZ's homicide if he "reasonably believes that he...is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm," except that it also requires that he "has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger" other than deadly force. There was expert witness testimony that he had, in fact, exhausted all other possibilities. So, unless I'm missing something (which I may well be), contra Burke, I don't quite see the moment that the state lost the fight to have the jury instructed on provocation as the moment GZ was acquitted, though I do agree that this is where the rubber hits the road in this case, and that it's odd that the question of this instruction seems to have received so little time and attention from the court. - http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/07/zimmermans-not-guilty.html